Tag: Copenhagen

After Copenhagen: new world disorder

coplogoIt’s a bit like reading the runes — trawling through reactions to the events of the last couple of weeks, trying to work out what the Copenhagen Accord means. I don’t mean a parsing of the words, though translating the language of diplomacy is never trivial, but what the various parties to the Accord, and the rest of the world, think it means — and crucially, what that implies for future action to reduce emissions.

For background, read this excellent BBC analysis of Copenhagen, and Joe Romm’s interesting take at Climate Progress (which refers to Bill McKibben’s reactions at Grist, plus there’s a more considered McKibben article at e360), but the article that really helped to crystallise my thoughts is Mark Lynas’ insider’s account of the final phases of negotiations:

Continue reading “After Copenhagen: new world disorder”

Copenhagen: no FAB deal

Barry Coates’ last blog from the Danish capital looks at what was actually achieved and where we go from here, and includes his final analysis of the conference. The full set of Barry’s updates are posted at Oxfam’s web site and also at Pacific Scoop.

Day 13 – Saturday 19th December

Looking back, looking forward

This is the way the summit ends. Not with a bang, but with a whimper. 119 world leaders came, they saw and they certainly didn’t conquer. They were captured by their limited vision, their vested interests and the lack of trust between them that has it roots in long standing divisions, including a denial of historical responsibility on the part of the major developed countries.

There was some serious damage done to reputations. The United Nations processes were deeply flawed, countries like New Zealand have been exposed as self-interested blockers and President Obama doesn’t walk on water. Some leaders came out with credit. The vulnerable countries, particularly the Pacific, negotiated hard and fought for 1.5°C to be included in the Copenhagen Accord – they succeeded but their efforts to have a clear aim for a legally binding treaty through this process was stripped out late last night. President Lula from Brazil assumed the mantle of world statesman with a powerful speech and an offer to help other developing countries. Thousands of civil society activists were able to build public support and attention across the world.

But to little avail. The final agreement was empty of content and extremely weak on the level of ambition. We came into the Summit calling for a Fair, Ambitious and Binding deal. We lost the Fair early on when Annex 1 countries could not agree to a financing package beyond the next three years. It was closely followed by the Ambition – leaders could not even commit to a global goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C. Then in the wee hours of this morning, the Binding was stripped out in a very untransparent way.

Next steps are for emissions reduction offers to be tabled by 31st January 2010. As explained below, that is a dangerous development, given the lack of political will to decent offers from Annex 1 countries. Then there will be a two week negotiating session in Bonn Germany from 31 May to 11 June 2010, followed by the next annual UN Climate Change Conference (CoP 16) towards the end of 2010 in Mexico City. None of that gives us much confidence that they will be able to muster the political will or bridge the political divides that are needed to provide the political mandates that are essential for a FAB deal.

Because their job is not done, nor is ours. We need to build a far more powerful campaign for the future. We must ensure that the politicians who caused this problem are held to account for this missed opportunity.

I am in a hotel with Oxfam colleagues from around the world, all having worked so hard but feeling pretty empty after this empty outcome. We are off to a bar to cheer ourselves up and to ask some of the tough questions about where to from here. And I will do so with partners in the Global Campaign for Climate Action (the TckTckTck campaign). Anything is on the table for re-thinking. Except wavering in our determination to secure this FAB deal. Anything else is unthinkable to ourselves, our kids, our planet and for billions of vulnerable people.

Since waking up this morning, I have been working with colleagues to prepare the following analysis. I hope you find it useful. But now I’m signing off from this blog and will take a few days off, to recover my health and my sleep. Happy Xmas to you all and thanks for reading these posts.

What the Copenhagen Decisions mean

December 19, 2009: There is extreme urgency. The scale of the crisis means that emissions need to peak within five years. People are already suffering unnecessarily from a lack of protection and support. We have just lost a year. The hope of millions of people has been frustrated and potentially a base of political support has been lost.

Status of Decisions:

AWG-LCA: Document UNFCCC/CP/2009/L6

The document setting out the conclusions of the work of the AWG-LCA was agreed. Tuvalu and Barbados sought to ensure the process would lead to a binding protocol.

CoP Decision:

“CoP takes note of the Copenhagen Accord 18 Dec 2009.” It is not agreed, only noted. Because there was not consensus on the Accord, it was agreed the Parties supporting it would be listed.

The Reasons for the Impasse

There were two interrelated issues that were to blame for the turmoil during the summit, although it should be recognised that the roots of this failure extend back at least to the initiation of the Bali Action Plan.

1. The Process

There were a small number of countries that came to this Summit without the intention of negotiating in good faith. They were generally countries that have massive vested interests in fossil fuels, or that exclusively focus on their short-term competitiveness. These countries often undermined the negotiations dynamic.

Many countries were left out of the ‘friends of the Chair” process and withheld their agreement. While there was an attempt to include negotiating groups, the selection of participants was not open and transparent. The problem was also that the Danish Presidency grossly mismanaged the process. It was most unfortunate that Heads of State found themselves effectively negotiating from the podium, rehearsing their national positions rather than proposing breakthroughs which had not been achieved in the preparatory meetings.

The usual brinkmanship was relied on to deliver an agreement after hours of late night working. This forced an agreement under conditions of tiredness, stress and bilateral influence (which opens up the potential for bullying and favours, reinforcing the positions of the larger and more powerful countries).

The breakdown of this process may signal that the days of stitching up deals in small selective groups and then expecting all countries to sign up are over. There must be questions over the style used for consensus building and decision making.

Climate change negotiations are starting to look eerily like trade negotiations, including the dominance of commercial self-interest in the position. We need processes which move us away from competitive negotiations, where countries try to minimise their concessions, to collaborative actions informed by the science, for example, conducting problem-solving sessions in mixed groups rather than blocks. It is clear that the UNFCCC negotiating process would need substantial reform to handle the complexity of this issue.

While the security challenges of such a meeting are huge, it is inexcusable that the forward planning did not take account of needing civil society and other observers to be present for transparency and legitimacy.

2. The Substance

The Annex 1 countries didn’t come to Copenhagen with sufficient offers and then didn’t improve them. Even the offer on long term finance was full of caveats and loopholes. The rich countries did not make offers that were based, even loosely, on sound science. We were told there would be final offers made during the last hours. These were never tabled.

Some developing countries came with proposals and concessions (eg. China on MRV, Brazil on financial contribution for developing countries and MRV, South Africa offer on emissions reductions). An analysis of Annex 1 offers compared to major developing countries offers on a consistent basis of below BAU (Business as Usual) is likely to show that at least some major developing countries are more ambitious than average Annex 1 levels (particularly when omissions and loopholes offered to Annex 1 countries such as on surplus AAUs, LULUCF accounting rules and bunker fuels are taken into account).

The loss of full agreement, that would have included international MRV for China, means that we potentially lose an important step that could help unlock the negotiations. Also at risk from the lack of full agreement is the agreement to the starter funding for adaptation and the goal on long term finance (even if not a commitment).

On the other side, the lack of full agreement means some of the unhelpful parts of the Accord are not locked in, such as a systematic lowering of ambition and a lack of clear commitment even to 2°C. The process for agreeing mid-term targets, without a criteria for burden sharing and a top down process to test the adequacy of targets, is of serious concern. Continuing the current pledge and review approach undermines equitable burden sharing and a level of ambition based on science. Current emissions reductions pledges by Annex 1 countries are outweighed by the loopholes. On current pledges, we are headed for a 3.9°C temperature rise.

On the positive side, there is at least a consolidation into a Chair’s text for AWG-KP and AWG-LCA which has helped unblock the large accumulation of previous texts that Parties refused to take off the table.

The Politics:

The agreement with China is a step forward in terms of gaining political capital for the Obama Administration’s position in the US; however, a full agreement to the Copenhagen Accord would have been more helpful. Unfortunately, the adversarial atmosphere in Copenhagen might be used to provide opponents of climate change and multilateralism with ammunition. More broadly, the lack of clear success might mean that some Heads of State would be wary of coming to the next Summit on climate change.

We face major challenges in calling for Parties to get back to negotiations given the likelihood that there will be a widespread perception that this would fail again. The lack of trust is even deeper than it was before Copenhagen (it should be observed this is not unique to the UNFCCC process – the Doha trade negotiations process isn’t much better). Moving forward, we will be challenged to say what has changed in the underlying political conditions where 116 Heads of State have failed.

Copenhagen closes: too little, too late

coplogoThe Copenhagen climate conference finally wrapped up in the wee small hours of Sunday morning NZ time (3:26pm Saturday in Denmark), with delegates agreeing to “take note of” a “Copenhagen Accord” [PDF here]. The agreement sets no legally binding targets, establishes no follow-on framework for Kyoto, only “recognises” the need to stay under 2ºC, and that parties “should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible”. On the plus side, the accord does provide for assistance to developing countries of US$30 billion over 2010-12, and commits to a “goal” of US$100 billion a year by 2020. The meeting ended after an all night plenary session in which a group of developing countries including Bolivia, Cuba, Sudan and Venezuela blocked progress because of the lack of binding targets for the developed world.

Although late drafts of an agreement included references to 80% cuts by 2050 for developed countries, this disappeared from the final text. All the Accord requires is that developed countries “commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy- wide emissions targets for 2020″, with these targets to be appended to the agreement by the end of January 2010. Developing countries can do the same, for their preferred emissions targets. This will all be reviewed by 2015, and in a nod to the small island nations, the review will consider strengthening the goal to a 1.5ºC limit.

The final deal was stitched together by the US and China, in a meeting with India, Brazil and South Africa, and effectively imposed on the rest of the world. Here’s how BBC environment correspondent Richard Black describes it:

Ministers and scientists and campaigners who dedicated huge swathes of the last year to making a tough deal happen watched aghast as Chinese and US leaders and their entourages flew in, took over the agenda and emerged with what was basically their own private deal, with leaders announcing it live on television before others realised it had happened.

As you’d expect, leaders from EU countries and the developing world that really don’t like this deal have been assuming rictus grins and telling us it’s a “good first step”.

New Zealand’s climate change ambassador Adrian Macey was equally unimpressed, describing the process as “appalling” in the Herald this morning. Sudan’s environment minister said the weak deal would commit Africa to a holocaust, and Ian Fry, spokesman for Tuvalu said it would spell the end of his country. More reaction at the BBC report & analysis, Telegraph, Guardian (editorial), New York Times, and Stuff.

My take? Copenhagen was always going to end with a deal of some sort, because too many leaders had too much mana invested in the process for there to be an overt collapse. However, the deal that’s been done — essentially a private affair between the US and China, imposed on the rest of the world and accepted only because something is better than nothing — delivers little in the way of concrete progress. Unless the momentum that built up before COP15 began can be maintained through the next year, and targets agreed and implemented in some sort of credible fashion, then the prospects for emissions peaking early enough to give the world a chance of staying under 2ºC will be essentially zero.

What are we left with? I suspect this process will bumble on for years, with many fine words and minimal action. One report suggested that China’s real position was that it would prioritise economic growth until climate impacts grew too severe, then go for rapid adaptation. If that’s true, then we’re all toast. Nothing really transformative will be attempted until the effects of warming are so severe that the world will be plunged into a wartime response to the issue. That’s when the climate commitment — the 30 years of warming in the pipeline — will really bite. I fear that the only interesting questions now are how soon, and how bad will it be?

Behind the scenes in Copenhagen: historic COP out

Oxfam NZ’s executive director Barry Coates provides perspective on the final day of negotiations in Copenhagen. With the dust still to settle, his analysis is about as thorough as you’re likely to find. The full set of Barry’s updates are posted at Oxfam’s web site and also at Pacific Scoop.

Day 12 – Friday 18th December

Historic opportunity, historic moment, historic CoP out

This saga is unfolding as I write. A few hours ago we thought the deal was done and put out an (almost) final press release. Then the apparent agreement between President Obama, Wen Jiabao, the EU, India, South Africa and a few other big countries started to unravel.

First the EU said they were unhappy about it (which may just have been spin doctoring to cover their embarrassment over a massively weak deal), then Sudan (chair of G77 – the group of developing countries) said they had not been consulted and would not accept the deal, and then AOSIS – the group of small island states – said they would be submitting a new draft agreement. As it has been for most of the past two weeks, the process is in chaos.

The day started as it has ended, with confusion about what was actually happening behind the scenes. The heads of state had met late into the night and we were leaked the draft statement at 2.30am. It was no surprise that leaders had not come with ambitious proposals but the obvious depth of disagreement was a surprise. The result was a very weak proposal that did not even fully agree the goal to maintain global temperature rise at below 2°C.

The much vaunted announcement of US$100 billion for long term funding turns out to be a goal to mobilise funds, not a commitment; to come from carbon markets, not just public financing; potentially a mix of new funds and diversion of existing aid; and without any specifics on the sources of funding. Oxfam has been calling for predictable funding that is raised directly (such as through a levy on airline and maritime fuels), rather than through national Treasuries (which could add to government budgets).

So this deal that is spun in the media as “an agreement to move forward’ is probably not an agreement, not much movement and it is doubtful that it is even forward.

I seem to have been doing this analysis of drafts for a very long time. There have been six versions and lots of discussions on each one. It is the last night of negotiations and I still haven’t made it to bed before 1am.

I was in the hotel for almost the whole day today, writing and analysing. But I have had a few breaks. One for meeting up with an old friend from Vietnam who works for the UN and one for an interview with TVNZ. The media have been very interested in the messaging from here – it has been great to be able to tell the real story from Copenhagen rather than the version according to the NZ government.

This won’t be the last blog. I am going to bail out tonight and catch up with the final statements in the morning. It’s a final wrap up day tomorrow, but with these negotiations you never know! This may appear to be a pretty disappointing outcome but it should really motivate us to re-double our efforts to get the Ministers back into the process.

Here are the details of what happened and where to from here:

Oxfam analysis of the Copenhagen climate change convention

The empty political statement issued from Copenhagen shows a historic lack of leadership. The key political decisions were not taken at the start of these negotiations and they have still not been taken. This job has not been done.

As a result, the blame game has started. Oxfam considers that the primary cause of failure lies with the rich nations – they have failed to come with proposals that would fulfil their responsibilities, while trying to shift the burden onto developing countries. It is welcome that the US, as one of the biggest polluters, has rejoined the multilateral system. But their proposals must strengthen, not undermine, the commitments from rich countries, which fall far short of averting climate catastrophe.

Poor countries negotiated strongly for a deal that is consistent with the science, and which aimed to protect vulnerable people and planet. The shame of Copenhagen was that rich countries have negotiated primarily on behalf of vested interests and industrial lobbies.

At best, we are now confronted with deadly delay that means unnecessary tragedy for millions of families. The impacts will be felt in every country, and will fall particularly hard on poor people in developing countries.

Just as alarming is that there is no clear and credible way forward to conclude a legally binding agreement soon. Leaders ducked the political decisions that have been lacking since the launch of negotiations two years ago in Bali. There is still no agreement to the fundamentals. This is unacceptable.

Analysis of the outcomes

The negotiations started with ten days of meetings between officials and then the high level segment of three days involving Ministers and Heads of State. The talks got off to a bad start with the leak of a secret draft of an outcome statement that the Danish government, as President of the Conference, was preparing. A selected group of countries was consulted in the drafting process, and the draft was seen to be biased towards the interests of the rich nations. When the Danish Prime Minister subsequently tried to introduce a draft text as a basis for negotiations, developing countries angrily rejected it.

Negotiations continued in the two tracks that were agreed in Bali two years ago – a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and a new Long Term Agreement (LCA). In Copenhagen, negotiators reduced the size of the document, but did little to agree the hundreds of unresolved issues.

There was also clumsy management of the talks over the attempt to combine the two negotiating tracks, strongly resisted by developing countries who saw it as part of an effort by rich nations to evade their commitments to emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. The talks teetered on the brink of collapse several times, wasting valuable negotiating time.

Then the Climate Change Ministers and 115 Heads of State arrived. The particular role for the high level segment was to come to agreement on the big political decisions that have been blocking negotiations. They failed to do so, primarily because rich countries, having promised to play their trump cards at the eleventh hour, turned up almost empty handed.

Global goal: Leaders could not even agree on a goal to keep global temperature increase well below 2°C – they only referred to the goal and undertook to enhance their action. So far, Annex 1 emissions cuts tabled in negotiations add up to only 13-19% below 1990 by 2020. When adjustments are made for the effect of loopholes on AAU surpluses (hot air), LULUCF accounting and bunker fuels, Annex 1 emissions would actually rise. This puts is on track for global temperature rise of well above 2°C and catastrophic climate change – modelling suggests by as much as 3.9°C.

Finance: The announcement of $100 billion for adaptation and mitigation by 2020 is an important step forward – finally specific amounts of funding are being discussed. But there is no clarity on how much will be public finance – reliable and predictable funds that will allow poor countries to plan and invest in adaptation and low carbon development. It seems that rich countries are keen to inflate the total with private finance through market mechanisms. Furthermore, there is no clear commitment that this money would not come from existing aid commitments, effectively diverting future spending away from essential services in poor countries. Finally there is no clarity on the individual commitments rich countries will make. This potentially continues a long line of empty promises by world leaders.

Legally Binding: The commitment to complete the deal is a hollow promise without a clear plan for what a legally binding treaty or treaties will look like, whether all rich nations will be legally bound to reduce their emissions, and how we will get there – and no new commitment period established under Kyoto.

Next steps:

Business-as-usual negotiations are failing to solve the climate crisis. Options on the table are too vague for decision-making, and do not reflect evolving climate science. Technical negotiators are debating issues that need ministerial mandate but too little time is given for ministers’ talks to make progress leading to last-minute late-night decisions. Governments are still focused on securing national interest instead of securing our shared destiny.

The international process must now gear up to a new level of talks. Sustained, intense and focussed engagement must run throughout the year – at the political, scientific, technical and public levels. The key to unlock these issues is political agreement on fundamental milestones. To move forward, negotiators must first agree a global goal, a scientifically credible range for mid-term emissions reductions, and a framework for funding.

1. Heads of State: demonstrate climate leadership – The last two years of competitive negotiations must now be turned into collaborative engagement for a deal in 2010, starting with a new mandate driven by Heads of State.

2. Ministers: prepare for Sleeping-Bag Ministerials – A set of intense quarterly meetings for both tracks of negotiations must drive to political agreement. Each ministerial should end only when its mandated milestone is reached: for example, to halve the number of brackets in the text, and halve the size of the numeric ranges set out in the remaining brackets.

3. Climate scientists: put facts back at the heart of negotiations – Climate science is evolving rapidly and alarmingly, but negotiations continue on the basis of outdated projections. Updated estimates on emissions trajectories from the IPCC are urgently needed, including a scenario for limiting global temperature rise to 1.5ºC.

4. Negotiators: provide analytical support for decisions – Vague definitions and unclear options in the text are holding up negotiations. Technical experts must clarify definitions and rules (such as on LULUCF accounting) to close loopholes, and detail options on burden sharing criteria and innovative finance mechanisms. LDCs should have access to technical support from a standing team in the UNFCCC. Civil society could contribute to the integrity of the negotiations by providing them with a formal role in submitting proposals.

5. Public support: build the case and widen the base – Over the past two years there has been a massive increase in public understanding of climate change and commitment to action. From the boardrooms of progressive businesses to communities across the developing world there is now a global demand for leaders to conclude a fair, ambitious and legally binding deal. Copenhagen may have been a cop out but Oxfam will continue to work with our partners and allies across the world in an attempt to avert climate catastrophe.

Craziness in Copenhagen

coplogoOur second guest blog from a member of the NZ Youth Delegation comes from Louis Chambers — a 20-year-old student studying in Otago. He grew up on a farm in Hawke’s Bay, where he developed a passion about the outdoors. With the rest of the twelve young New Zealanders in Copenhagen, he’s doing his best to ensure that the youth perspective is heard at this critical time.

It is impossible to capture the diversity of the Copenhagen negotiations in one article. There is a city packed full of climate change seminars, events and displays. There are hundreds of businesses, NGO’s and universities offering regular talks and lectures. Even if you make it to the negotiations, they are so formal and detached that the human lives behind climate change are forgotten. The challenge is to stay focussed in the face of masses of information, numerous distractions and a negotiating process which reduces a critical moral issue down to numbers and data.

The first thing to realise is that the term “Copenhagen negotiations” is misleading. There is so much more going on other than just negotiations. For example, there have been incredible speeches from the likes of Desmond Tutu and Bill McKibben (the founder of 350). Unfortunately I did not see either of these speakers: I was too busy at the host of other events available. There are events looking at climate change in almost every context, from human rights to business, local government to youth.

If these events and speakers do not capture your imagination, then the negotiations themselves should. The negotiations bring together 192 countries from every corner of the world. When I first sat in the “plenary session”, the sheer number of countries blew my mind. The discussions took me on a tour of the globe as my geography was tested by the numerous countries awaiting their turn to speak.

However, in the excitement of the negotiations, I realised that what is important is to keep focussed on the reality of climate change. That reality is that behind all awe and the fun, all the men in suits, there are human lives being negotiated. As the International Youth Climate Movement often says: “Survival is not negotiable”. This realisation symbolises a process which occurs here. We are blown away by the information, the glamour and the opportunity. Yet in the same instant we realise that the magnitude of the challenge faced is incredible.

People power can still drive political change here in Copenhagen
The difficulty I have had in these negotiations is that Governments themselves lose this perspective. They become lost in all the numbers and the data. They also become lost in the world of politics. As different countries try to “win” the political game, they forget why we are all here.

Why are we all here? As young people, we have been able to remind Governments that we are here to negotiate our future. Behind all the numbers and all the politics is a stark choice. If we cannot keep global warming below 2 degrees, we are effectively choosing to erase any hope of a safe, not to say prosperous, future.

Of course, even simple goals like keeping warming below 2 degrees are not easy. In order to reach this goal, you do need the economic models and the complex data. You do need politicians who can negotiate.

The problem is that so far in these negotiations politicians seem to have become so immersed in how to reach the goal that they have forgotten why the goal itself is so important. As the New Zealand Youth Delegation, we have been working hard to keep the importance of the goal fresh in their minds. As we run out of time to reach an agreement, you can do this too.

Send a love letter to John Key at www.dearjohn.co.nz. We are currently delivering letters from this site in person to John Key. Or join 12.5 million other people from around the world in calling for a fair, ambitious and binding agreement here in Copenhagen – click here.

After all, we are the ones who give leaders the power to lead. Currently, the draft text is confused and complicated. It is no surprise given the complexity of issues here in Copenhagen. However, Kyoto was negotiated at the last minute. With over 110 leaders here in Copenhagen now, we certainly have enough political will to produce the result the world wants and which our future generations need.

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