Category: environment and ecology

Things to come: adapting to climate change in NZ

When I first began to realise what a serious matter climate change was I found it difficult to get interested in adaptation. It sounded to me like acceptance of something that should be resisted. And I disliked the bland voices claiming that the effects of global warming would be easily adapted to if not positively beneficial. However with time I’ve recognised that there is no escaping adaptation. It is as much a part of coping with the threat of climate change as mitigation, and the one doesn’t displace the other. Indeed the need for adaptation may sharpen awareness and spur determination to turn away from fossil fuel energy.

New Zealand appears unlikely to be one of the worst-affected countries as climate change begins to bite. But changes will occur and adaptive responses be demanded. The Climate Change Centre’s recent publication Climate Change Adaptation in New Zealand: Future scenarios and some sectoral perspectives (pdf download here) is a contribution from the scientific community towards discerning what form those responses may need to take.  Gareth announced its publication a few weeks back and over coming weeks I’ll try to report on at least some of the chapters.  I’m starting with a look at the second chapter Global & local climate change scenarios to support adaptation in New Zealand, written by Andy Reisinger and four others.

 

What will we need to adapt to? That depends on what the world does about future carbon emissions. The paper selects and explores two different global scenarios following divergent emissions pathways. One is a high carbon world. It assumes that there will be no concerted efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It represents a fractured world with varying socio-economic and technological development in different geographical areas. It will likely result in large rates of climate change, warming of almost 4 degrees above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, and severe impacts in many regions.

The other scenario is of a rapidly decarbonising world with rapid concerted global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to limit greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations to about 450 ppm CO2-equivalent. This results in a long-term increase in global temperature of about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. In this scenario the global impacts of climate change impacts would be limited in their severity and extent, but some regions would still experience significant negative impacts.

The paper envisages possible strains between the two nations in the high carbon scenario, including population pressure on New Zealand and a more protectionist stance in Australia.

Before moving to specific effects on New Zealand climate the paper discusses the possible flow-on effects for us from the more generalised global impacts of the changing climate.  Our near neighbour Australia, likely to suffer severe effects from climate change, figures largely in these considerations. The paper envisages possible strains between the two nations in the high carbon scenario, including population pressure on New Zealand and a more protectionist stance in Australia.  Under the rapidly decarbonising scenario by contrast we could expect a more harmonised and cooperative approach to mitigation and adaptation. In relation to the wider world the paper points to a number of possible effects for New Zealand in the high carbon scenario ranging from instability in the Pacific Islands to possible new international trade barriers and new alliance groupings. In the rapidly decarbonising world we can expect some benefits from the changes in energy production systems and technologies, as well as some costs.  International trade agreements are likely to be linked to climate and environmental efficiency standards.

The paper then turns to specific climate changes in New Zealand, focusing mainly on temperature and precipitation. One or two things struck me particularly in this section. In relation to temperature it is in the latter half of the century that the high carbon scenario diverges most strikingly from the rapidly decarbonising scenario. Projected temperatures rises in New Zealand are below the global average, but coping with around a 1.25 degree change by the end of the century looks much preferable to the around 2.5 degrees over much of the country that is projected under the high carbon scenario.  Precipitation changes show a strong west-east gradient driven by the expected increase in southern hemisphere westerly winds. The increases in the west and decreases in the east are markedly stronger in the high carbon scenario by the end of the century.

In treating other climate elements and extremes in New Zealand the paper is less specific, on the grounds that not enough scientific work has yet been done. However in the matter of temperature extremes it finds decreases in frost occurrence and increases in high maximum temperatures are robust findings. It expects roughly that by the 2030s what is currently an unusually warm year will have become the norm, and an unusually warm year in the 2030s will be outside the ranges of temperature experienced in New Zealand to date.

On precipitation extremes it suggests that a currently experienced extreme rainfall with a 100-year return period could occur approximately twice as often under a local warming of about 2 degrees. It notes that increasing flood peaks resulting from these extremes will interact with rising sea levels.

Drought magnitude and frequency are expected to increase, with the possibility of a current 1-in-20 year drought occurring at least twice as often in some eastern areas under a warming of about 2 degrees.  Fire risks are likely to be more marked, especially in eastern areas.

Sea level rise receives separate attention.  The paper suggests that coastal risk assessments should assume that the probability of sea level rise of at least 0.5 m by 2100 is high, but the possibility of even 2 m cannot be absolutely excluded and sea level will continue to rise beyond 2100 for many more centuries.  Compounding factors such as storm surges and changes in wave patterns need to be taken into account.

It would be a mistake to assume that, because the climate changes projected for New Zealand are relatively lesser in rate and magnitude compared to the rest of the world, adaptation is therefore a less important question for us.  Sea level rise will be at least the global average of change. Effective management of the large range of ecosystems and natural hazards is constrained by our small budgets and pools of expertise to inform decisions, all the more because of our decentralised approach to decision-making in such areas. We are strongly linked to global processes through international policies, technologies, trade and flow of people and goods and services and must be sensitive to this.

There’s much for New Zealand to be concerned with internally in the ongoing process of adaptation. Climate risk assessment should precede new infrastructure development. Difficult conflicts may be associated with the loss of opportunity in, for example, the development of a coastal property because of its vulnerability to future sea level rise. The danger of local councils with limited resources being captured by special interests raises the question of the extent to which binding guidance should be provided to councils by central government on matters of adaptation.

As the selection of scenarios indicates, we can’t be sure what adaptive measures will be required in the future. But we will have no reason to be taken by surprise.

Biochar: looking better all the time

Interesting biochar research is reported in a news release from the American Society of Agronomy.  An Australian research team has been testing the effects of biochar on nitrous oxide emission and nitrogen leaching from two different soil varieties. Their results are reported (no charge for this month) in the Journal of Environmental Quality.

The study demonstrates that biochar, applied to soils to capture and store carbon, can reduce emissions of the potent greenhouse gas nitrous oxide and inorganic nitrogen runoff from agriculture settings.

Continue reading “Biochar: looking better all the time”

Monckton is a fraud

Christopher, Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, pompous peer of a parish in Kent, not content with threatening legal action against US scientist John Abraham (who had the temerity to point out the huge number of errors and misrepresentations in a talk he gave: see Support John Abraham, now 1050+ comments), has now threatened action for libel against Professor Scott Mandia. Mandia wrote a blog post in support of Abraham, inviting members of the media to consider if Monckton were a fraud — which drew a spiteful little email from Tannochbrae…

I also note that you have publicly accused me of “fraud”, and have widely circulated that accusation on the internet, and have expressed the intention to invite the mass media to repeat it. Since this is a serious charge, do you have any evidence to back it up, or should I add your name to that of Professor Abraham in the libel case that will be filed shortly?

Mandia’s open letter to the media asked them to “expose Monckton for the fraud that he is”, which is somewhat different to an accusation of fraudulent behaviour. Let’s examine the evidence, and see if Monckton can reasonably be described as “a fraud”, and whether his actions and public statements are in themselves fraudulent. First we need some definitions:

Continue reading “Monckton is a fraud”

After the defeat

“Sometimes dead really is dead — and for this Congress, barring a miracle, climate action is finished. With an ugly election looming in November, it may be years before we get another chance to debate a bill that prices carbon.”

 

That’s Eric Pooley writing this week in Yale e360. He’s the author of The Climate War, reviewed here a month ago. His e360 article recognises a defeat. But not the war’s end.

“Some will argue that this latest setback is proof that the U.S. will never cap carbon. I reject that view. All we can say for sure is that the U.S. will never cap or price carbon until the politics of the issue change — so the first order of business must be to begin improving the political atmosphere.”

He looks at the main culprits of the current defeat and suggests how strategy might be improved for the future

The Professional Deniers. Their disinformation, amplified via the Internet, helped poison the debate. To counter the deniers’ campaign, President Obama needs to speak out forcefully, and champions of the clean energy economy must point to how effective it is proving.

Senate Republicans. It’s hard to forge centrist solutions when an entire party is denying there’s a problem and vilifying the solutions. A scaled-back approach, one that can be sold as a modest, incremental step and not a new industrial revolution, might fare better.

Senate Democrats. A dozen or more centrist Democrats — from states that either mine coal or produce much of their electricity from it — were dug in against the bill. It is impossible to tell if the senators were truly concerned about what the cap would do to their state economies — nonpartisan studies suggest its impact would be minimal — or just worried about what attack ads would do to them. Again, a more modest first step could change the dynamic.

The Green Group. The Green Group (an unofficial association of the leaders of the big U.S. environmental organisations) held out for an economy-wide bill even after it became clear, in late 2009, that it was unachievable in the Senate. Only recently, and too late, did they try to negotiate a compromise cap on electric power plants, which account for 40 percent of U.S. emissions.

The Power Barons. They sought too much by way of free carbon allowances and regulation easing.  The pleasure some of them took in the demise of the bill may be short-lived as the battle to reduce emissions moves to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the courts. There was only one player with the clout to cut a fair deal with the power barons and he was missing in action.

The President. He chose not to lead on this issue. He never threw himself behind a particular climate bill. He left it to the Senate, the Green Group, and the power bosses — all of whom were sorely in need of adult supervision. To the bitter end, the White House pursued what his aides called a “stealth strategy” that deployed the president only sparingly. It was a colossal failure of nerve, and a decision that likely destroyed any chance of achieving climate action in Obama’s first term.

It may take time to get another shot at legislation, but in the meantime Pooley points to important work to be done. Greenhouse gas emissions have been dropping in the US, and not just because of the recession. Many clean energy projects are under way across the country that save money, create jobs and reduce emissions. Existing regulatory authority can enhance that trend. It won’t be sufficient, but it will provide evidence to voters that cuts are both technologically feasible and economically sustainable.

Until the next legislative opportunity comes the climate war will be waged by cities, states, regional cap-and-trade programmes, and, above all, the EPA. It will be the sort of costly, protracted, plant-by-plant trench warfare the cap was intended to avoid. Since the utilities and the manufacturers weren’t willing to cut a deal, this is what they get. The fragile period of compromise and cooperation between environmentalists and big business may now be coming to an end.

There will be an attempt to strip the EPA of its authority over carbon. That is a fight Obama can’t possibly duck because “it is our last line of defence”.

I welcomed those early bold words of Obama on climate change: “The science is beyond dispute and the facts are clear. Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all.” Not all the blame for this defeat can be laid at his door, but he has hardly displayed the upfront leadership his words indicated we might expect.

Not that leading from the front would necessarily have produced a different outcome.  Those opposing forces which Pooley identifies are very powerful in American society and Pooley, critical though he is of the President, doesn’t suggest that a head-on collision would have produced a better result. In fact he seems to be suggesting that a more incremental strategy may be the best way to counter the implacability of the bill’s political opponents.

Incidentally, Joe Romm notices that Eric Pooley omits the press from his “Murderers’ Row” listing for the bill’s homicide.  It’s an omission he finds surprising given that in his book Pooley takes the press to task. Romm himself would certainly add them. He even posits that if Obama hadn’t wimped out and had delivered strong public messages the media might well have destroyed the impact by “balancing” it with bad economics and scientific disinformation.

Pooley has followed the climate war closely over a period of three years, as he details in his book. He didn’t predict a successful Senate outcome. Indeed he concluded the book with a picture of campaigners shaking off their blues, throwing back their shoulders, and marching back to the sound of the guns. What else can they do?

Postscript: The kind of pressure the EPA is likely to experience and the robustness of its response can be seen in its recent rejection of petitions challenging its 2009 determination that climate change is real, is occurring due to emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities, and threatens human health and the environment.

Obama’s failed climate strategy

Obama must take a different tack, says economist Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, writing in the Guardian. The President has been pursuing a failed strategy of negotiating with senators and key industries to try to forge an agreement, making no headway in the back rooms of the White House and Congress. What he should have done, and still should do, is to present a coherent plan to the American people.

“He should propose a sound strategy over the next 20 years for reducing America’s dependence on fossil fuels, converting to electric vehicles, and expanding non-carbon energy sources such as solar and wind power. He could then present an estimated price tag for phasing in these changes over time, and demonstrate that the costs would be modest compared to the enormous benefits.”

The candidate of change has not presented real plans of action for change. Sachs charges that the administration is in the paralysing grip of special-interest groups. He’s not sure whether this is an intended outcome to secure large campaign donations or just the result of poor decision-making, or maybe a bit of both.

Sachs has several things to say leading up to his urging a presidential plan. He opens with a blunt statement. “All signs suggest that the planet is still hurtling headlong toward climatic disaster.” Yet we still fail to act.

He identifies three major challenges which make action difficult.  First, energy and agriculture (including deforestation to create new farmland) are the two principal sources of emissions, and they are two economic sectors which stand at the centre of the global economy and involve the whole world’s population. It’s no small matter to change those systems.

The second challenge is the complexity of the science, involving many thousands of scientists in all parts of the world. Uncertainties attend the precise magnitude, timing, and dangers of climate change. The general public has difficulty grappling with this complexity and uncertainty, especially as changes occur over a timetable of decades and centuries rather than months and years, and are intermixed with natural variations.

The third problem arises from a combination of the economic implications and the uncertainties of the science. It is the “brutal, destructive campaign” against climate science by powerful vested interests and ideologues, aimed at creating an atmosphere of ignorance and confusion. Major oil companies and other corporates have financed disreputable PR campaigns, exaggerating the uncertainties and absurdly charging that climate scientists are engaged in some kind of conspiracy to frighten the public.

Sachs attacks the Wall Street Journal’s aggressive editorial campaign against climate science, which has been running for decades:

“The individuals involved in this campaign are not only scientifically uninformed, but show absolutely no interest in becoming better informed. They have turned down repeated offers by climate scientists to meet and conduct serious discussions about the issues.”

There is a fourth over-arching problem — the unwillingness or inability of US politicians to formulate a sensible climate-change policy, despite America’s central role in global emissions. When Obama was elected he clearly wanted to move forward on this issue, but will not be able to do so on the path so far chosen.

Sachs’ comment seemed to me to say all the important things with clarity and precision. And he’s in no doubt about what is at stake. We are courting disaster.

“Nature doesn’t care about our political machinations. And nature is telling us that our current economic model is dangerous and self-defeating. Unless we find some real global leadership in the next few years, we will learn that lesson in the hardest ways possible.”

Sachs is no intellectual lightweight. His books The End of Poverty and Common Wealth have been widely read.  He has twice been named as one of Time magazine’s “100 Most Influential People in the World” in 2004 and 2005. The clear perception he displays of the central issues of climate change for the US must surely represent a substantial body of educated American opinion. Alas, not yet substantial enough. For the present the babble of denial and delay prevails.