Author: Bryan Walker

Farming’s future in NZ: adapt or decline

How will our land-based primary industries manage the climate changes ahead? That’s the question addressed by chapter 3 in Climate Change Adaptation in New Zealand (pdf download here). The general impression given is that they won’t fare too badly provided appropriate adaptive measures are taken. The chapter, contributed by a team of nine, reports on modelling examples from the three major areas of forestry, arable farming and pastoral farming. It’s apparent that there is a level of complexity to farming operations which is very difficult to embrace in any study and the writers make it clear that much ongoing research will need to be undertaken. I’ll pick out a few salient points from the paper.

 

So far as forestry is concerned productivity is likely to be affected by changed CO2 levels, rainfall and temperature. Fire danger will increase in most areas of New Zealand. Increased severe winds are also predicted in some parts of the country. Pests and fungal diseases are likely to be strongly affected and the impacts of weeds and fungal pathogens could change, as could the establishment and distribution of insect pests.

The forestry modelling reported was focused on two common fungal diseases which affect forest productivity. One of the two diseases responds positively to aerial applications of copper oxychloride, and there may need to be changes to the way these are made as risk areas are identified. Other adaptation options for both diseases might include developing disease resistant genotypes, changing the regimes to modify the within forest microclimate (especially air movement and humidity), changing the tree species totally on at risk sites, and possibly moving the forests to less risky sites as the climate changes.

Adaptation strategies in general will involve normal forest practices and, provided a good understanding of the changes needed is obtained, the study concludes we should be able to maintain the health and productivity of our forests.

Arable farming is likely to benefit from climate change, provided nutrients and water supply are not limited. (That  struck me as a big proviso.) The advantages result from a number of factors. One is the fertilising effect of increased CO2 . Another is the rise in temperature causing crops to grow faster, be harvested earlier, and leave more options for subsequent crops. A warmer drier spring means soil dry enough for earlier cultivation and sowing operations.  An extended frost free period enables frost-sensitive crops to extend their range. And so on. A model run of one crop showed a 16% increase in yield by 2090 under the high carbon scenario and a 3 week earlier harvest.

But the water and nutrient caveat is important, particularly as most cropping occurs on the east coast, which is expected to see more hot, dry weather. Irrigation systems will need to be efficient, and crops with a deeper root system may fare better.  For although climate change increases yield potential and management flexibility in systems that have good water availability, it does the opposite for dryland systems and those with limited irrigation.  The paper notes that there remains significant uncertainty around the impacts of climate change on water flows in the major alpine rivers which underpin the east coast irrigation water supply.

Pastoral farming, the biggest contributor to New Zealand’s agricultural exports, was approached through modelling a Manawatu dairy farm. It was modelled on a single mid-range climate change scenario. Two soil types were modelled, clay and sand. Pasture production increases, especially between 2000 and 2030, were predicted, particularly in late winter, spring and summer.  Potentially this is due to increased temperatures and solar radiation and increased prevalence of C4 (warm season) grasses. But the C4 grasses led to a reduction in pasture quality during summer and spring.

Unadapted systems resulted in a decline in milk solids production per cow and per hectare in both 2030 and 2080, compared with 2000.  The picture changed when adaptation measures were undertaken. Key adaptation measures included a range of farm management decisions which included earlier calving and increased stocking rates.  With such measures the paper reported adaptation can be profitable and turn the potential negative of lower pasture quality into the positive of more production.  However the writers acknowledge that they did not consider the impacts of the recommended adaptations on significant environmental issues. More cows may increase nutrient and greenhouse gas losses from the farm.

It was such consequences that left me wondering how robust some of the adaptation measures may prove to be. Currently more cows mean more methane. Adaptation measures which also increase greenhouse gas emissions will surely be looked at askance by 2030. And the prospect of more nutrient run-off is fraught with environmental consequences. For arable farming the irrigation issue carries many questions likely to prove difficult of resolution. However there will no doubt be closer examination of these and other adaptation possibilities as time proceeds.  Presumably Federated Farmers will eventually emerge from its bunker and share in the process. The paper speaks of farm producers in New Zealand as innovative and adaptable and able to live with climate variability. But it points to climate change as more than variability when it goes on to ask whether those producers will be adaptable enough to manage a changing as well as variable climate. In the current mind-set of denial displayed by much of the farming community that seems to me an open question.

Lester Brown: Russian heat hits world grain supplies

One of the things that persuaded Gwynne Dyer that it was time to write his book Climate Wars was the realisation that “the first and most important impact of climate change on human civilization will be an acute and permanent crisis of food supply”. He’s not the only one to recognise that. Many of us hearing about what the Russian heat wave is doing to crops have no doubt been wondering what the effect of so much loss might be on global supplies. Right on cue Lester Brown, whose Plan B books always lays great stress on food reserves, has produced  an updateon what the failed harvest in Russia might mean.

 

“Russia’s grain harvest, which was 94 million tons last year, could drop to 65 million tons or even less. West of the Ural Mountains, where most of its grain is grown, Russia is parched beyond belief. An estimated one fifth of its grainland is not worth harvesting. In addition, Ukraine’s harvest could be down 20 percent from last year. And Kazakhstan anticipates a harvest 34 percent below that of 2009. (See data.)”

He notes that the heat and drought are also reducing grass and hay growth, meaning that farmers will have to feed more grain during the long winter. Moscow has already released 3 million tons of grain from government stocks for this purpose. Supplementing hay with grain is costly, but the alternative is reduction of herd size by slaughtering, which means higher meat and milk prices.

The Russian ban on grain exports and possible restrictions on exports from Ukraine and Kazakhstan could cause panic in food-importing countries, leading to a run on exportable grain supplies. Beyond this year, there could be some drought spillover into next year if there is not enough soil moisture by late August to plant Russia’s new winter wheat crop.

The grain-importing countries have in recent times seen China added to their list. In recent months China has imported over half a million tons of wheat from both Australia and Canada and a million tons of corn from the US. A Chinese consulting firm projects China’s corn imports climbing to 15 million tons in 2015. China’s potential role as an importer could put additional pressure on exportable supplies of grain.

The bottom line indicator of food security, Brown explains, is the amount of grain in the bin when the new harvest begins. When world carryover stocks of grain dropped to 62 days of consumption in 2006 and 64 days in 2007, it set the stage for the 2007–08 price run-up. World grain carryover stocks at the end of the current crop year have been estimated at 76 days of consumption, somewhat above the widely recommended 70-day minimum. A new US Department of Agriculture estimate is due very soon, which will give some idea of how much carryover stocks will be estimated to drop as a result of the Russian failure.

We don’t know what all this will mean for world prices. The prices of wheat, corn, and soybeans are actually somewhat higher in early August 2010 than they were in early August 2007, when the record-breaking 2007–08 run-up in grain prices began. Whether prices will reach the 2008 peak again remains to be seen.

Brown performs the obligatory ritual of acknowledging that no  single event can be attributed to global warming, though I would have thought that by now that proviso could be taken as read. It’s surely more important to affirm, as of course he does, that extreme events are an expected manifestation of human-caused climate change, and their effect on food production must be a major concern.

“That intense heat waves shrink harvests is not surprising. The rule of thumb used by crop ecologists is that for each 1 degree Celsius rise in temperature above the optimum we can expect a reduction in grain yields of 10 percent. With global temperature projected to rise by up to 6 degrees Celsius during this century, this effect on yields is an obvious matter of concern.”

Demand isn’t going down to match the reduction:

“Each year the world demand for grain climbs. Each year the world’s farmers must feed 80 million more people. In addition, some 3 billion people are trying to move up the food chain and consume more grain-intensive livestock products. And this year some 120 million tons of the 415-million-ton U.S. grain harvest will go to ethanol distilleries to produce fuel for cars.”

And the obvious conclusion:

“Surging annual growth in grain demand at a time when the earth is heating up, when climate events are becoming more extreme, and when water shortages are spreading makes it difficult for the world’s farmers to keep up. This situation underlines the urgency of cutting carbon emissions quickly—before climate change spins out of control.”

There’s a podcast in which Lester Brown speaks at greater length, elaborating the matters covered in his written update, and amongst other things commenting on how we might be thankful, from a global grain harvest perspective, that it was Moscow and not Chicago or Beijing which experienced temperatures so far above the norm. The grain loss would have been much higher in either case.

It’s worth adding that while the Russian event is dramatic in terms of its obvious impact on exports of grain globally, there are plenty of other places where food production is threatened by extreme events or by other  trends which are in line with climate change predictions. It is impossible to look at the vast flooding of land in Pakistan and not wonder how they will cope with the washing away of millions of hectares of crops — there have been “huge losses” according to the BBC.

“We need to cut carbon emissions and cut them fast.”

Looking on the dark side

Daniel Gros, the Director of the Centre for European Policy Studies, has written a grim articlein the Guardian, concluding that the influence of coal lobbies in the US senate is too strong for any significant action to be taken on climate change there and that the ramifications will be widespread. I thought it worth drawing attention to.

Succinct and blunt, he sees the EU strategy of leading by example with an emissions trading scheme as in tatters. The US senate’s failure to deliver a legislative package means that it will not live up to the promises made by the administration at Copenhagen. China’s undertaking to increase its CO2 efficiency will not prevent its emissions from rising substantially as it pursues a close to 10% growth rate. Indeed, by 2020, Chinese emissions could be more than triple those of Europe and even surpass those of the US and Europe combined.

 

The attempts to set prices for global carbon emissions have failed because coal is cheap and abundant. Compared to natural gas and crude oil, coal is much cheaper per ton of CO2 released. This implies that any tax on carbon has a much higher impact on coal than on crude oil (or gas). Owners of coal mines and their clients are, therefore, strongly opposed to any tax on carbon. They wield immense lobbying power to block efforts to limit CO2 emissions by putting a price on them, as the planned US cap-and-trade system would have done.

A cap-and-trade system was easier to introduce in Europe where indigenous coal production is no longer playing an important economic role.

“The US experience has wider implications. If it proved impossible to introduce a moderate carbon tax in a rich economy, it is certain that no commitment will be forthcoming for the next generation from China, which remains much poorer and depends even more on indigenous coal than the US. And, after China, India looms as the next emerging coal-based industrial superpower.”

The diplomatic “travelling circus” will carry on, giving the impression that the world’s leaders are still working on a solution to the problem. But CO2 emissions will continue to rise as a rapidly growing industrial base in emerging markets is being hard-wired to intensive use of coal. This will make it exceedingly difficult to reverse the trend in the future.

Gros concludes that a planet composed of nation-states that in turn are dominated by special interest groups does not seem capable of solving this problem. Unfortunately, there is enough cheap coal around to power ever-higher emissions for at least another century. The world will thus certainly become much warmer. The only uncertainty is how much warmer that will be.

“Determined action at the global level will become possible only when climate change is no longer some scientific prediction, but a reality that people feel. But, at that point, it will be too late to reverse the impact of decades of excessive emissions. A world incapable of preventing climate change will have to live with it.”

Gros paints a sombre picture. One can understand his pessimism, and respect the clarity with which he expresses it. It’s as well to know what we are up against. But we can also hope he is wrong about the point at which determined action can begin. I still find it hard to believe that all our political leaders will carry on with just talk until doomsday. Some of them are willing to acknowledge that the predictions of the science are already manifesting themselves. President Medvedev, in the face of Russia’s horrifying heat, has recently said “…what is going on with the world’s climate at the moment should incite us all (I mean world leaders and heads of public organisations) to make a more strenuous effort to fight global climate change.”

It’s important to look despair in the face from time to time, but also to hang on to hope that there will be an awakening before it is too late.

Hansen in Norway

James Hansen has reported on his recent visit to Norway to receive the Sophie Prize. Hope springs eternal, he comments, and in spite of his disappointments with other world leaders, even those purported to be of the “greenest” variety, he wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of Norway prior to his visit.

“As you know, I am fond of Norway, and have great respect for your country and its citizens, as well as for your personal ambitions to protect global climate. Your recent rainforest initiative is a splendid example of leadership the world desperately needs. And your commitment at the Copenhagen climate talks to reduce Norway’s emissions 40 per cent by 2020 was exemplary.

“However, and especially in light of that, I am disappointed to learn that Statoil, Norway’s state-owned oil company, has taken such backward strides through its strategic decision to invest in Canada’s destructive tar sands industry. As the most energy-intensive source of oil, this project represents the worst of what humans are doing to the planet in a quest to prolong our global addiction to fossil fuels.

“It is still feasible to stabilize the climate, but only if we leave the tar sands in the ground. The massive greenhouse gas amounts from the tar sands surely would cause the climate system to pass tipping points, while also trampling on the human rights of Canada’s First Nation communities and greatly damaging the Canadian boreal forest.”

He went on to urge that the government, which owns two thirds of the shares of Statoil, support a resolution at the AGM that Statoil pull out of the tar sands engagement.

His reply came from the Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Energy, and after opening pleasantries got down to business:

“As you now know from the results of the Statoil Annual General Meeting, we see Statoil’s oils sands investment as a commercial decision which is within the Statoil board’s area of responsibility. We are of the opinion that such decisions should not be overturned by the AGM. It is our opinion that this is in line with good corporate governance, a view that is also shared by a vast majority in the Norwegian Parliament. I can however assure you that we will continue our offensive stance on climate change issues both at home and abroad, and we look forward to your continued engagement.”

Hansen offers the wry comment that a Norwegian grandfather, upon reading the Deputy Minister’s letter, quoted Saint Augustine: “Hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue.”

In his acceptance speech Hansen said:

“The Norwegian government’s position is a staggering reaffirmation of the global situation: even the greenest governments find it too inconvenient to address the implication of scientific facts. Perhaps our governments are in the hip pocket of the fossil fuel industry – but that is not for science to say.

“What I can say from the science is this: the plans that governments, including Norway, are adopting spell disaster for young people and future generations. And we are running out of time.”

The Hansen et al 2008 paper Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim? set out the need for CO2 to be reduced to 350 ppm if we wish to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilisation developed. He sees this target carrying three essential policy requirements:

  • coal emissions must be phased out rapidly
  • unconventional fossil fuels, such as tar sands, must be left in the ground
  • we should not pursue every last drop of oil and gas, especially in pristine regions

That is the message from science to politicians as Hansen sees it. Politicians everywhere seem to be still finding reasons to reject it. Whether the excuse is preserving “good corporate governance” in Norway, or Gillard’s procrastinating argument that Australia needs a ”deep and lasting community consensus”, or Brownlee’s determination in New Zealand to extract wealth from deep sea drilling and coal exploitation, or American senators’ sectional loyalties, there’s still a very large gap between what the science says is necessary and what governments are prepared to do.

“I have been disappointed in interactions with more than half a dozen nations. In the end, each offers only soothing words, “goals” for future emission reductions, while their actual deeds prevent stabilization of climate.

“The glib response of Norway’s Prime Minister is that we are ‘future pessimists’. Clever engineers, he says, will solve the problem, perhaps with carbon capture. Meanwhile it is o.k. to develop tar sands and go after the last drop of oil in the Arctic. This is nonsense of course. Even if they use nuclear power to squeeze the oil from tar sands, the CO2 will come out of tailpipes. Also, the environmental destruction in Canada would never be allowed by Norwegians in Norway.”

Hansen not only reiterated the scientific message in Norway, but also hammered another constant refrain, that the only way to put a sensible price on carbon is by a carbon fee on oil, gas and coal, with the proceeds returned to the population on a per capita basis to allow lifestyle adjustments and spur clean energy innovations. His insistence on this has been criticised by fellow activists who favour cap-and-trade approaches and who accuse him of straying into the policy field where he lacks expertise.

But he is convinced that “cap-and-trade-with-offsets” is a system rigged by big banks and fossil fuel interests. He sees it as inviting corruption. “Worse, it is ineffectual, assuring continued fossil fuel addiction to the last drop and environmental catastrophe.”

Whether he is right about that seems to me to remain an open question. But he is certainly right about the imperative to reduce emissions sharply, and about the evasiveness of politicians who say the right things but do something different.

Things to come: adapting to climate change in NZ

When I first began to realise what a serious matter climate change was I found it difficult to get interested in adaptation. It sounded to me like acceptance of something that should be resisted. And I disliked the bland voices claiming that the effects of global warming would be easily adapted to if not positively beneficial. However with time I’ve recognised that there is no escaping adaptation. It is as much a part of coping with the threat of climate change as mitigation, and the one doesn’t displace the other. Indeed the need for adaptation may sharpen awareness and spur determination to turn away from fossil fuel energy.

New Zealand appears unlikely to be one of the worst-affected countries as climate change begins to bite. But changes will occur and adaptive responses be demanded. The Climate Change Centre’s recent publication Climate Change Adaptation in New Zealand: Future scenarios and some sectoral perspectives (pdf download here) is a contribution from the scientific community towards discerning what form those responses may need to take.  Gareth announced its publication a few weeks back and over coming weeks I’ll try to report on at least some of the chapters.  I’m starting with a look at the second chapter Global & local climate change scenarios to support adaptation in New Zealand, written by Andy Reisinger and four others.

 

What will we need to adapt to? That depends on what the world does about future carbon emissions. The paper selects and explores two different global scenarios following divergent emissions pathways. One is a high carbon world. It assumes that there will be no concerted efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It represents a fractured world with varying socio-economic and technological development in different geographical areas. It will likely result in large rates of climate change, warming of almost 4 degrees above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, and severe impacts in many regions.

The other scenario is of a rapidly decarbonising world with rapid concerted global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to limit greenhouse gas and aerosol concentrations to about 450 ppm CO2-equivalent. This results in a long-term increase in global temperature of about 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. In this scenario the global impacts of climate change impacts would be limited in their severity and extent, but some regions would still experience significant negative impacts.

The paper envisages possible strains between the two nations in the high carbon scenario, including population pressure on New Zealand and a more protectionist stance in Australia.

Before moving to specific effects on New Zealand climate the paper discusses the possible flow-on effects for us from the more generalised global impacts of the changing climate.  Our near neighbour Australia, likely to suffer severe effects from climate change, figures largely in these considerations. The paper envisages possible strains between the two nations in the high carbon scenario, including population pressure on New Zealand and a more protectionist stance in Australia.  Under the rapidly decarbonising scenario by contrast we could expect a more harmonised and cooperative approach to mitigation and adaptation. In relation to the wider world the paper points to a number of possible effects for New Zealand in the high carbon scenario ranging from instability in the Pacific Islands to possible new international trade barriers and new alliance groupings. In the rapidly decarbonising world we can expect some benefits from the changes in energy production systems and technologies, as well as some costs.  International trade agreements are likely to be linked to climate and environmental efficiency standards.

The paper then turns to specific climate changes in New Zealand, focusing mainly on temperature and precipitation. One or two things struck me particularly in this section. In relation to temperature it is in the latter half of the century that the high carbon scenario diverges most strikingly from the rapidly decarbonising scenario. Projected temperatures rises in New Zealand are below the global average, but coping with around a 1.25 degree change by the end of the century looks much preferable to the around 2.5 degrees over much of the country that is projected under the high carbon scenario.  Precipitation changes show a strong west-east gradient driven by the expected increase in southern hemisphere westerly winds. The increases in the west and decreases in the east are markedly stronger in the high carbon scenario by the end of the century.

In treating other climate elements and extremes in New Zealand the paper is less specific, on the grounds that not enough scientific work has yet been done. However in the matter of temperature extremes it finds decreases in frost occurrence and increases in high maximum temperatures are robust findings. It expects roughly that by the 2030s what is currently an unusually warm year will have become the norm, and an unusually warm year in the 2030s will be outside the ranges of temperature experienced in New Zealand to date.

On precipitation extremes it suggests that a currently experienced extreme rainfall with a 100-year return period could occur approximately twice as often under a local warming of about 2 degrees. It notes that increasing flood peaks resulting from these extremes will interact with rising sea levels.

Drought magnitude and frequency are expected to increase, with the possibility of a current 1-in-20 year drought occurring at least twice as often in some eastern areas under a warming of about 2 degrees.  Fire risks are likely to be more marked, especially in eastern areas.

Sea level rise receives separate attention.  The paper suggests that coastal risk assessments should assume that the probability of sea level rise of at least 0.5 m by 2100 is high, but the possibility of even 2 m cannot be absolutely excluded and sea level will continue to rise beyond 2100 for many more centuries.  Compounding factors such as storm surges and changes in wave patterns need to be taken into account.

It would be a mistake to assume that, because the climate changes projected for New Zealand are relatively lesser in rate and magnitude compared to the rest of the world, adaptation is therefore a less important question for us.  Sea level rise will be at least the global average of change. Effective management of the large range of ecosystems and natural hazards is constrained by our small budgets and pools of expertise to inform decisions, all the more because of our decentralised approach to decision-making in such areas. We are strongly linked to global processes through international policies, technologies, trade and flow of people and goods and services and must be sensitive to this.

There’s much for New Zealand to be concerned with internally in the ongoing process of adaptation. Climate risk assessment should precede new infrastructure development. Difficult conflicts may be associated with the loss of opportunity in, for example, the development of a coastal property because of its vulnerability to future sea level rise. The danger of local councils with limited resources being captured by special interests raises the question of the extent to which binding guidance should be provided to councils by central government on matters of adaptation.

As the selection of scenarios indicates, we can’t be sure what adaptive measures will be required in the future. But we will have no reason to be taken by surprise.